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To Double Business Bound: Play and the 
contemporary Field of  Sport
INTRODUCTION
There’s a recent Nike television commercial that neatly encapsulates the relation between 
the notion of play and the contemporary cultural field of sport. The scene is a football game 
(in former British colonies such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA, a soccer 
game) between the national teams of Brazil and Portugal. As the players walk, side-by-side, 
through the concrete subterranean passage that lead onto the field, the scene is clearly 
recognisable as early 21st - century sport, characterised by overt organisational, capitalist 
and media markers. The teams (selected by a manager appointed by the respective national 
federations) are wearing national colours, with the shirts supplied by multinational sports 
companies (Brazil, for instance, have signed a long-term contract, and are closely associated, 
with Nike). Many of the players – Roberto Carlos, Ronaldo, Figo, Ronaldino – are instantly 
recognisable worldwide because of their appearances in the global media, both as players in 
international and national competitions and as media stars. They are frequently the subject 
of news stories about transfer rumours or failed romances, or they appear in advertisements 
for football boots or upcoming games. At the same time the choice of teams hints at the 
continuing presence, even with professional global sport, of a lingering ludic disposition: 
Brazil and Portugal share a tradition of playing and valuing what we might call skilful, non-
ends-directed football, in contrast to national teams such as Germany, England and even 
Italy and Argentina, which have usually adopted a more instrumental approach to the game. 
One of the criticisms made of the many highly talented teams emanating from Portugal, 
for instance, is that they were/are more taken with playing with the ball than scoring goals; 
similarly, it was often said of Brazil (until repeated failures at the World Cup in the seventies 
and eighties caused something of a change of heart and tactics) that they would rather ‘play 
beautifully and lose’ than resort to ‘ugly’ football (playing defensively, systematic fouling, 
resorting to long balls, etc.).
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There is nothing obviously playful about this occasion, however. It is quite clearly an important 
competition match organised and sanctioned by FIFA: the players’ faces and bodies show 
signs of seriousness and tension, and they process slowly and deliberately, stare intently 
ahead, and are too focused to acknowledge the other team that shares the space. They 
eventually emerge from the tunnel and take the field in a modern stadium (perhaps with a 
retractable roof) filled with as many as one hundred thousand (the capacity of the stadium 
having been determined, among other things, by safety regulations and requirements) seated 
fans who have paid something in the region of hundreds (legally) and thousands (to scalpers) 
of US dollars a seat, depending on the importance of the match and the location of the seats. 
Some of the more desirable seating will be located in corporate boxes owned or rented by 
large corporations, who have invited important business clients to be their guests at the game, 
and have provided them with restaurant-quality meals and drinks. The game, and all the actions 
constituting it, will be strictly circumscribed regarding its temporal, spatial and material 
characteristics and dimensions. Action will begin, cease and recommence only when the 
referee blows the whistle, and takes place within a marked space commensurate with FIFA 
rules regarding the length and breadth of the field and its various components (such as the 
penalty area). The game will usually be of ninety minutes duration (including time added on 
for stoppages), even if the result is a foregone conclusion after thirty minutes and the spectators 
are leaving in droves. Players must wear appropriate gear: to wear the wrong coloured shorts, 
or only one sock, or a shirt with one sleeve ripped off, or with writing or other marks on the 
gear other than those of the official or recognised sponsors or makers, would result in a player 
being removed (temporarily or otherwise) from the field. And this applies to bodies as well, in 
the case of, say, an injury that causes bleeding, or of the exposure, however brief, of a player’s 
buttocks to the crowd in order to display a (presumably very brief) political message.
There will be a strict demarcation between officials and players, and players and spectators. 
The media may purport to ‘take viewers into the middle of the action’, but if a spectator 
somehow climbed over the partition that separated them from the players and evaded 
the numerous trained security staff and police and ran onto the field they’d be chased, 
apprehended, ejected from the ground and heavily fined. The crowd at the venue will be joined 
by hundreds of millions of viewers around the world watching and listening to the game on 
live and delayed telecasts, through both terrestrial and satellite media, on television, radio 
and through the internet. A pre-game show will analyse past results, injuries and the possible 
influence of the referee on the outcome. Highlights of previous games will be accompanied by 
a plethora of statistics (team and individual) about passes-per-shot-at-goal, goals-per-game, 
time-in-possession, tackles, fouls, goals and assists (although this will be paltry in comparison 
to the statistical information provided by networks covering, say, a World Series baseball game). 
Every significant action (offside decisions, fouls, goals) will be replayed, in slow motion and at 
ordinary speed and from numerous angles, both on a large screen within the stadium (broken 
only by sponsorship messages), and to media viewers. At halftime a panel of experts (made 
up of past and current players and managers, as well as journalists and media commentators) 
will analyse incidents, provide opinions about what is happening and why, and predict the 
outcome. The match receipts will be in the tens of millions of US dollars, but this will be 
dwarfed by the television and internet rights, and the advertising revenue generated by board 
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space around the ground, or the right to exclusively kit out one or both teams. The players 
will be paid out of this revenue, as will the federations, managers, coaches, physio’s, doctors, 
publicists, agents, halftime entertainers, the singer of the respective national anthems, and 
the referee and linespersons (who will almost certainly be men). Once the game has finished, 
it will continue to be textualised and analysed and to generate intertextual references – as 
well as income. Television networks around the world will show highlights during the sports 
segment of the evening news; newspapers and magazines will write stories about the game 
and its dramas, heroes and villains; videos and DVDs of the game will be produced, packaged, 
advertised and sold. Reputations will be made and lost (with important consequences for 
salaries, contract extensions and sponsorship revenue), players will be induced to change 
clubs, and millions of fans will celebrate or drink away or violently manifest their sorrow, 
depending on the outcome. Politicians will line up to be photographed with the winners, and 
questions will be asked in the political institutions of the losing country. A government might 
even fall as a consequence of the result.
None of this is actually shown in the commercial –  rather, it’s implied by what we see in those 
opening shots. Sporting advertisements usually mirror or reproduce, in miniature, the field 
and its practices, values, rules, agents and institutions, with the stars, drama, excitement, 
crowd and skill of the game condensed into a few visuals. A typical football commercial would 
show a star like Ronaldo or Beckham on the ball, a scything tackle being skilfully avoided, the 
winning goal blasted into the back of the net, the celebrations of the players, the fans shouting 
and screaming with joy. And the name of the sponsor would be associated with the action, 
the players and the gear, but also with the passion, excitement and beauty of football.
But this isn’t a typical sporting commercial. Let’s go back to the scene we were describing: 
Brazil and Portugal are on their way to take part in an institutionally authorised, important 
and very serious sporting contest, when the players start behaving as if they were children 
or teenagers having a kickabout on a Brazilian beach. One player takes possession of the 
ball and starts playing with it – juggling it, bouncing it off walls, flicking it up into the air. The 
rest join in, trying to get the ball away from the first player in order to outdo his tricks. The 
intensity, pace and skill increases as each person ups the ante, until the action resembles 
a pinball game with the ball flying in all directions. Then suddenly the referee appears. He’s 
clearly horrified by what’s going on, tackles (actually fouls) the player in possession (Ronaldo) 
and retrieves the ball. The final scene shows that the order of things has been restored: 
the dignified looking referee holds the ball; a national anthem plays, the crowd sings, the 
cameras pan across the players now literally back in line, hands behind their backs. They are 
blackened, dirty, dishevelled and chastened, but focused and in possession of themselves: 
the final message of the commercial is that playtime is over, and sport takes its place.
One of the points that the commercial is making is that sport isn’t just reducible to the 
institutionally authorised practices associated with and organised by the field of sport. The 
meta-narrative of the commercial – the narrative that explains the narrative, if you like – is 
that the strong influence the media and corporate values, logics and interests (including, of 
course, Nike’s) exert over sport has started to kill off everything that is supposedly interesting 
and valuable about it – whether it’s spontaneity, flair, individuality or fun. The commercial 
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reproduces this perspective (the spontaneity and fun manifest in the players at play gives 
way to sport-as-business and media spectacle) but simultaneously qualifies or even denies 
it by showing that no matter how much the field and its institutions attempt to banish play, it 
always returns when you least expect it. In other words, the commercial effectively says the 
opposite of what it purports to say: sport is alive and well, spontaneous and fun, because the 
disposition to play never leaves it. Even when the field of sport is at its most business-like, 
doing its best to banish or exclude the spontaneity and wastefulness associated with play 
(represented by the figure of the referee rescuing sport from play); it simultaneously has to 
cover itself by producing performances of its commitment to the idea that, at heart, sport is 
still just play (hence the Nike commercial). In the remainder of this article we’ll identify and 
describe what we mean by play, mainly through reference to the work and ideas put forward 
by various theorists of play such as the Dutch cultural historian Johan Huizinga (author of 
Homo Ludens) and the French sociologist Roger Caillois (Men, Play and Games), and consider 
why the concept continues to function as a form of cultural capital even within contexts and 
cultural fields that are antithetical to it.  
THE ORIGINS AND FUNCTIONS OF PLAy
We’ll approach play from two perspectives, the first corresponding to questions about its origin 
and nature, the second to its socio-cultural forms and functions. With regard to the first set 
of questions, there are no theoretical accounts or explanation which we can accept without 
some reservations. However, there are bodies of work which, although they only deal with the 
origins of play indirectly or tangentially, provide useful departure points for the move to our 
second, and more explicable, task – which is to describe, understand and contextualise play 
as a socio-cultural activity. The theorist we turn to for this purpose is the French Sociologist 
George Bataille, a colleague of the aforementioned Roger Caillois.
A child building a sandcastle on the beach, someone doodling on a notepad in a long meeting, 
or an NFL player performing a celebratory dance after scoring a touchdown: all these activities 
can be contextualised in terms of what George Bataille refers to as a ‘general economy’1, 
which he defines as “a play of energy with no end limits.”2 Bataille differentiates general 
economy from specific economic systems, which are understood as “particular operations 
with limited ends.”3 All three of the activities referred to above come under the category of 
a general economy because the energy expended appears to have no systematic or rational 
utility – or at the very least, the potential gains associated with such acts of play (as a form 
of training or learning, or drawing attention to oneself) seem inadequate or incommensurate 
with regard to most economic regimes. The necessary articulation that is presumed, within 
a closed economy, between expenditure and growth (understood here as an advantage – for 
instance as learning a useful skill, or acquiring some form of cultural or financial capital) 
has only a tenuous relationship with the activities of building a sandcastle, doodling or the 
impromptu performance of a dance. General economy, on the other hand, offers an entirely 
different narrative with regard to this question of expenditure, one that is predicated not on 
gain but on loss:
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As soon as we act reasonably we want to consider the utility of our actions; 
utility implies…a maintenance of growth. Now if it is necessary to respond to 
exuberance, it is no doubt possible to use it for growth. But…supposing there 
is no longer any growth possible, what is to be done with the seething energy 
that remains? To waste it is obviously not to use it. And yet, what we have is a 
draining-away, a pure and simple loss, which occurs in any case: from the first, 
the excess energy, if it cannot be used for growth, is lost.4  
Bataille doesn’t completely abstract these issues: he provides them with various historical 
contexts and trajectories, for instance characterising the differentiation between the two forms 
of economy as becoming particularly marked after the Reformation.5 But for our purposes 
the notion of a more or less universal, necessary and wasted expenditure of energy fits in 
neatly with, and offers a convenient point of origin for, the disposition to play. Moreover, the 
sense of pleasure and/or desire that animates processes of waste and loss, and which is 
implied in Bataille’s statement that “life starts only with the deficit of…systems… [and] order 
and reserve has meaning only from the moment the ordered and reserved forces liberate and 
lose themselves for ends that cannot be subordinated to anything one can account for”6, is 
clearly commensurate with the notion of play as pleasure-in-escape (from the everyday, from 
boredom, from social restrictions and routines).
The second aspect of Bataille’s work on the general economy of energy that is particularly 
relevant to our understanding of the origins of the disposition to play is bound up with his 
interest (following Marcel Mauss7, Huizinga and Caillois) in the curious phenomenon of 
‘potlatch’. Bataille’s reading of ‘potlatch’ (which is perhaps best described as a systematic and 
apparently pointless destruction or gifting of wealth) is that it is a loss (goods are destroyed) 
that appears to be a disguised utility (it is not done in isolation, but in front of others, which 
means that the one suffering the loss acquires capital) that is in fact a disguised loss 
(nothing is really produced and energy is wasted, but the imperatives of the closed economy 
appear to be adhered to). But the real theoretical or exemplary value of potlatch, for Bataille 
and theorists of play such as Huizinga and Caillois, is that it is an obvious instance of the 
community being played (by a very powerful disposition), rather than the other way round. In 
other words, although the community may produce all kinds of explanations, rationales and 
narratives about potlatch and similar processes which appear to place agency in their hands 
(‘it really does have a utility’; ‘we’re only doing this to garner prestige and capital’), in fact it 
is the community which is being played (along).
Play, from this perspective, is a disposition that inhabits or passes through sites, in different 
forms and intensities at different times, but which is often narrativised as, and recuperated in 
terms of, individual or even communal agency. This is important because the great theorists 
of play (such as Huizinga and Caillois) specifically and resolutely define it as a non-productive 
activity, even while allowing that the question of what constitutes utility is highly problematical.8 
So if we return to the Nike commercial we can say that Ronaldo, Roberto Carlos, Figo and the 
others indulge themselves in footballing tricks, acts of display and an expenditure of energy 
that clearly stand outside the order of a closed economy (they are about to play an important, 
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competitive game of football with national and individual prestige at stake, not to mention the 
financial rewards that go to the winner). And while the commercial implies that each over-the-
top performance of skill is in fact part of an ongoing agonistics between élite professionals that 
will have its winners and losers, this is hardly comparable to the significance of an authorised, 
international sporting contest. Put simply, the concepts of agency and/or utility can’t account 
for the moment of madness when professional footballers turn into children.
HoMo Ludens
The notion that play inhabits and animates individuals and communities, and continues to 
exert a strong socio-cultural presence even in its apparent absence, is one of a number of 
important insights derived from the work of Johan Huizinga . In Homo Ludens (1966) Huizinga 
represents the notion of play as both a universal abstraction (he posits that it is not only prior 
to culture – it effectively animates it) and a historically situated disposition-as-practice. Play, 
for Huizinga:
is more than a mere physiological phenomenon or a psychological reflex…It is 
a significant function…that is to say, there is some sense to it. In play there is 
something ‘at play’ which transcends the immediate needs of life and imparts 
meaning to the action. All play means something. If we call the active principle 
that makes up the essence of play ‘instinct’, we explain nothing.9 
This quote identifies two fundamental characteristics of play. Firstly, it “is a thing of its own”10: 
it has no biological purpose, doesn’t “serve something which is not play” 11, and is possessed 
of its own generic qualities. It gives rise to an infinite number of socio-cultural manifestations 
and transformations, but always within a strictly limited regime of characteristics, imperatives 
and qualities. Secondly, although play has no moral or ethical function, it is both a catalyst for 
imaginative activity and stands in opposition to a mood or culture of seriousness (interestingly 
enough, in this characterisation play replicates the roles Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) ascribes to 
laughter in Rabelais and His World.12 That play is opposed to seriousness does not mean, 
however, that play can’t be a very serious and even intense activity – after all, and as we’ve 
seen with the Nike commercial, the disposition to play has the capacity to possess people 
and move them out of or away from their everyday duties and responsibilities. In order to deal 
with this and other apparent contradictions that arise from Huizinga’s account of play (on the 
one hand play is opposed to seriousness/play can be serious; on the other play is free/we 
are played) we need to consider his contextual analysis, located at the end of Homo Ludens, 
of what he calls the “play element in contemporary civilization.”13
As well as being self-serving and opposed to seriousness, play has, for Huizinga, six generic 
aspects: it is voluntary or freely adopted; disinterested and irreducible to any utility; distinct 
or sequestered from ordinary life; creates and demands adherence to order (through the 
adoption of rules or patterns of behaviour); operates under temporal and spatial limits; 
and is either representational or agonistic (that is, competitive in some respect). Huizinga 
provides elaborate descriptions, definitions and examples of what he means by these terms, 
but the key to reading, explicating and grounding play-as-practice is his argument that, from 
Schirato – Double Business – Junctures, 7, Dec 2006
17
the 19th century on, play atrophies.14 In other words, it is easier to recognise more precisely 
what Huizinga means by play, and to reconcile the apparent contradictions in his accounts 
of it, once we know what kinds of socio-historical forces and tendencies ‘send it away’. When 
Huizinga uses the term ‘contemporary civilization’, he is in effect referring to 19th-century 
industrial Britain and its legacies. One of the most significant of those legacies is modern 
sport, and it is here that the differentiation between play and its other is, for Huizinga, most 
pronounced:
Now, with the increasing systematisation and regimentation of sport, something 
of the pure play-quality is inevitably lost…In modern social life sport occupies 
a place alongside and apart from the cultural process…The ability of modern 
social techniques to stage mass demonstrations with the maximum of outward 
show in the field of athletics does not alter the fact that neither the Olympiads 
nor the organized sports of American Universities nor the loudly trumpeted 
international contests have, in the smallest degree, raised sport to the level of a 
culture-creating activity. However important it may be for players or spectators, it 
remains sterile. The old play-factor has undergone almost complete atrophy.15 
There are three factors in Huizinga’s account of modern sport that differentiate it from play, 
and the first and by far the most important of these is that it is derived from a world-view 
that is essentially utilitarian and rationalist. In Huizinga’s account of play and its generic 
characteristics, play is of and for itself, rather than a means to an end; and while play may 
take itself seriously, it doesn’t extend that privilege – a rejection that is reciprocated by a 
utilitarian mindset. Everything follows from this, and cleaves a path between play and sport. 
So the ambiguities or apparent contradictions found in Huizinga’s use of terms such as free 
and voluntary, ordered, temporal and spatial limitations and representations or agonistics 
become clear once we contextualise them within one order of discourse or another. Within an 
instrumentalist order of discourse freedom, order, spatial limitations and competition have 
very specific inflections. Football players may take the field voluntarily, but if the dominant 
motivation behind their play is financial gain or to improve their fitness, then they aren’t 
playing. Similarly, although there is order in, and spatial and temporal limitations to, a kick-
about amongst players in a park (they may tacitly agree to take turns in kicking, one may 
act as goalkeeper while the others take shots, shots at goal should be from about the edge 
of the penalty area, etc.) that is a very different situation from the necessary adherence, on 
the part of professional footballers, to the exact iterations and regularities articulated in a 
FIFA rulebook.
For Huizinga, two additional factors – capitalism, and what we can refer to, after Foucault 16, 
as the reason of state – contribute to this differentiation of play from sport. Although both 
are clearly derived from a utilitarian/rationalist worldview, they take different socio-cultural 
forms. The economies of time and effort that go into the creation and maintenance of the 
play-civilisation nexus – Huizinga writes that “civilization is, in its earliest phases, played…it 
arises in and as play, and never leaves it”17 – are theoretically untenable within a capitalist 
order: if time is money, there is no place for the unproductive use of time. With the reason of 
state we are in different territory. When Huizinga writes about “the ability of modern social 
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techniques to stage mass demonstrations with the maximum of outward show in the field 
of athletics”18 he is clearly referring to state-managed spectacles such as the 1936 Berlin 
Olympics: here the investment of time and effort in rituals is paramount, but the point or ends 
of such an investment is the maintenance and/or accumulation of prestige, or the training, 
disciplining and pacification of the state’s bodies and minds. Although the account of play 
that Huizinga produces in Homo Ludens situates it within a socio-historical narrative, it is 
difficult not to read that narrative as more mythical than historical, with the prototype being 
that of a fall from some kind of golden age. The problem with this account, in which play 
more or less succumbs to, and is atrophied by, historical forces and developments, is that it 
contradicts Huizinga’s thesis that “civilisation is…played…it arises in and as play, and never 
leaves it.”19 What is implied here is that play is a disposition that inhabits not just people 
and places but, as Huizinga admits, worldviews and institutions that are entirely antithetical 
to it. He devotes a small section of Homo Ludens to a discussion of business as play, but 
never seriously pursues the line of enquiry, which logically follows from his own premises, 
that capitalism (and for that matter the workings of the reason of state) arises from, and is 
characterised by, a strong sense of play. 
Men, PLay and GaMes
This aporia in Huizinga’s account of play is picked up and addressed by Roger Caillois in his 
book Men, Play and Games (2001), which provides a systematic categorisation of play-as-
genre, divided into different forms (agon, alea, ilinx, mimicry, which correspond roughly to 
the institutions of sport, gambling, festivals/carnival and shows) and poles (at one extreme 
we have ludus, where rules and conventions are fetishised, and at the other paidia, which is 
improvised and even anarchic). We don’t have time to rehearse or evaluate his system: what 
is more useful for our purposes is the way Caillois demonstrates how play, which he defines, 
following Huizinga, as being in opposition to and of a different order from institutionalised 
socio-cultural activities, comes to be ‘two things at once’ – simultaneously official culture and 
its antithesis. Caillois’ account of the play function in human society is strongly influenced by 
the insights and arguments found in Homo Ludens. Although he finds most of its premises 
“debatable”20, he acknowledges Huizinga’s two main achievements – providing an exact 
definition of play, and clarifying its socio-cultural function.21 At the same time he takes him 
to task for both defining play in terms which are “too broad and too narrow”22; and secondly 
and concomitantly for cleaving play off from “all material interests.”23 
Caillois’ insistence that play is “an occasion of pure waste”24 within a wider setting or context 
where financial and other capital can be exchanged (such as sport and gambling) is consistent 
with regard to Huizinga’s insistence on the necessary imbrication of play and its ‘other’ – in a 
sense more consistently and faithfully than Huizinga himself. For Caillois, the salient features 
of play are close to those provided by Huizinga, but with some important differences and 
qualifications:
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Play…creates no wealth or goods, thus differing from work or art…play is an 
occasion of pure waste: waste of time, energy, ingenuity, skill, and often of 
money…Play must be defined as a free and voluntary activity, a source of joy 
and amusement. A game which one would be forced to play…would become 
constraint…from which one would strive to be free. As an obligation or simply 
an order, it would lose one of its basic characteristics: the fact that the player 
devotes himself spontaneously to the game, of his free will and for his own 
pleasure, each time completely free to choose retreat, silence, meditation, idle 
solitude, or creative activity…[play occurs] only when the players have a desire 
to play…in order to find diversion, escape from responsibility and routine…In 
effect play is essentially a separate occupation, carefully isolated from the rest 
of life.25 
Caillois insists, following Huizinga, that authentic play is separated off from much of ordinary 
life because of its non-productive (art does not count as play because it produces material 
goods) and volitional (professional sportspersons are working, not playing) nature. But he 
recognises that those material and historical contexts of ordinary life (the workplace, post-
industrial society) are both what is being escaped from, and the sites of escape. So while 
the casino as an institution is part of the wider field of capitalism, not all the activities that 
take place within it, nor the motivations of the players, are explicable in terms of a capitalist 
regime or logic. Gambling, for instance:
remains completely unproductive. The sum of the winnings at best would only 
equal the losses of other players. Nearly always the winnings are less, because 
of large overheads, taxes, and other profits of the entrepreneur. He alone does 
not play, or if he plays he is protected against loss by the law of averages. In 
effect, he is the only one who cannot take pleasure in gambling.26 
We find much the same situation when we consider the Nike commercial and the situation 
it represents. We noted that the narrative seems to be suggesting that play and sport 
are necessarily differentiated: the chaotic activity that erupts before the game starts is 
quintessential play (it’s volitional, wasteful, separated from ordinary life, creative and clearly 
escapist), but what happens (or will happen) afterwards – the referee taking charge and 
forcing the players to adhere to the demands of the real, institutionalised game – clearly 
belongs in the category of work (at least for Caillois). But let’s give closer consideration to 
this apparently neat differentiation. Firstly, what is to stop the same players from ‘losing it’ 
again once they’re on the field; in other words, why can’t play break out, not just in the tunnel 
prior to the game when and where hardly anybody is watching (play, from this perspective, 
requires a physical and temporal separation from institutional scrutiny), but during the game, 
even as the referee, managers, media and fans look on? We couldn’t expect to see a similar 
kind of group frenzy: if players started performing, repeatedly and openly, in a non-utilitarian 
and wasteful manner, they’d probably be substituted, ridiculed by the media and fans, and 
perhaps even find themselves subject to legal action (they could be accused, for instance, 
of throwing the game). Certainly the field and its institutions would ensure that what was 
perceived as consistently wasteful and self-indulgent play would have serious consequences, 
regardless of the status of the players.
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However, there are a number of examples of this phenomenon (wasteful play inhabiting 
professional sport) in English and world football in the last forty years: Rodney Marsh of 
Queens Park Rangers and Matt Le Tissier of Southampton were favourites with the fans, 
although often berated by managers and sports analysts, because of their penchant for 
‘playing’ to a different logic than that of the team. Both were highly skilful – but idiosyncratic 
and self-indulgent – players who found it difficult to fit into game plans and rarely did the 
‘workmanlike’ tasks their managers expected of them (tackling back or helping out the 
defence when the team was under pressure, not taking risks in tight situations, etc.). They 
could score spectacular goals, and were capable, on their day, of winning a game on their 
own; but they are often remembered for their non-utilitarian contributions (juggling the ball 
in the middle of an intensely competitive game; making an opponent look stupid by beating 
him more than once, etc.). Non-English examples include the Columbian goalkeeper Rene 
Higueta, who once let a shot sail over his head so he could mule-kick it from behind his back, 
and the Bulgarian international Dimitar yakimov who, in the middle of a 1966 World Cup game 
against Brazil, went off on a mazy dribble that took him past player after player (sometimes 
twice) to absolutely no effect – save for the obvious pleasure of doing it.
If we follow this line of thinking a little further we can find numerous other examples of the field 
of professional sport and its spaces, ostensibly defined, delineated and ruled by the logic of 
utility, being used for the purposes of play – and not just by the players. The crowds that attend 
games do so for a number of reasons: most will have a passionate attachment to a club or 
national team, some go to be entertained, while others simply want to socialise with friends. 
And then there is the more recent phenomenon of fans dressing up in extravagant, eccentric 
or colourful costumes and so adding to the spectacle of the occasion (the “Barmy Army” that 
follows the English cricket team to Australia being one example). All of these activities and 
motives are recuperable within the logic of sport-as-capitalism. In other words, following a 
team or wanting to be part of a sporting spectacle requires people to become consumers both 
in direct (buying tickets to the game, hiring costumes) and tangential (transport costs, meals 
and drinks) ways. This is apparent if we go back to Caillois’ non-sporting example of the casino, 
which is set up and institutionalised in order to take advantage of, and turn a profit from, 
the desire and propensity of gamblers to play/dissipate. But just as professional footballers 
aren’t always necessarily workers, so spectators aren’t simply consumers: they usually go to 
games of their own volition, gain no advantage, are separated off and escape from the ordinary 
world, and engage intensely and creatively with the material at hand (players, officials, other 
members of the crowd). And although they are situated within a context and institutional 
space that is animated by an economy of pure utility, and concomitantly are complicit with 
regard to its dominant logic (as consumers they help somebody to make a profit), their own 
activities and motives are very much in keeping with what the French anthropologist Rene 
Girard calls “to double business bound.”27 
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PLAy AS SOCIO-CULTURAL PRACTICE
We have accepted the definitions and imperatives that Huizinga and Caillois apply to the 
concept of play without many reservations or qualifications, but we clearly need to find other 
ways to make sense of the relationship between the disposition to play and the socio-cultural 
fields and institutions (such as professional sport) in which this disposition is manifested as 
a socio-cultural practice. There are two theoretical perspectives we can call upon to address 
this problem: the first is to be found in Michel de Certeau’s book The Practice of everyday 
Life (1988), and the second is variously articulated in a collection of essays in The social Life 
of Things, edited by the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1988).
We made the point that play has to be considered as being “on double business bound”, and 
De Certeau argues that this is (necessarily) the case with many cultural practices. He posits a 
series of binaries, such as place/space and strategies/tactics, as a means of characterising 
the relationship between valorised and authoritative institutions and their agents, and those 
who are, precisely because of power differentials, obliged to perform compliance with regard 
to those official regimes. So a factory, bureaucracy, church or, say, a professional sport are 
simultaneously places (maintained and guaranteed by networks of power and capital, and 
able to dictate or negotiate the rules of practice to those who deal with and inhabit them) and 
spaces (which is what a place becomes when it is put to unofficial uses, such as a worker 
using company property for personal ends, or a fan following and identifying with a team 
which is run as a business). Places make use of strategies, which De Certeau describes 
as “the calculus of force-relationship” which becomes possible when an institution attains 
relative autonomy within and “can be isolated from an environment.”28 Spaces, on the other 
hand, are inhabited by tactics or calculations “which cannot count on a spatial or institutional 
location.”29 The disposition to play necessarily manifests itself within the world and its cultural 
fields, most of which are distinctly disinclined to take or tolerate it on its own terms. There are 
some places (the family, child-care centres) where play of-and-for-itself is not just allowed but 
even encouraged, but these institutions and contexts are mainly associated with children or 
the terminally befuddled, who are partly exempt from incorporation into the logic of a closed 
economy.
There are times and places that are set aside for play (weekends and holidays; sports fields 
and resorts) but this regimentation of the times and sites of play is antithetical to the notion 
of play as spontaneous and volitional. And institutions of play (for example, professional 
sport and its contests) host play on their own terms, both overtly (witness the rules and 
regulations concerning, say, what sport’s spectators may or may not do in different places 
at different times) and otherwise (hence the organization of ‘spontaneous’ activity on the 
part of crowds). In this regulated environment, play is very much like De Certeau’s tactic that 
“insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, 
without being able to keep it at a distance.”30 If play is forced to operate in another place, that 
is to say within institutions that endeavour to colonise it, then two things become apparent. 
First, play necessarily takes on forms that would seem, from the perspectives offered by 
Huizinga and Caillois, to constitute its antithesis (work, capitalism, regimentation). Second 
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and concomitantly, the places supposedly operating within the logic of a closed economy 
are not what they seem – they are sites and spaces of waste and dissipation. The American 
sports historian Allen Guttmann points out that:
Moments of play appear unpredictably in the most unlikely places, even upon 
the gallows…In the film Cool Hand Luke, a group of convicts bewilders the guards 
by increasing the tempo of their road-work, by running back and forth in eager 
performance of their imposed tasks, by laughing, by turning punishment into 
play…Had the convicts begun the game purely for their own amusement…the 
activity would have been…phenomenologically indistinguishable from the 
utilitarian work that was done.31 
CONCLUSION
This imbrication of play with its other leads to the question of whether it is possible to 
distinguish play at all. Some forms of play remove themselves, materially, temporally and 
psychologically, from contexts that intrude upon play’s volitional nature (Caillois’ notion of 
play-as-ilinx, for instance, is predicated on an attempt to escape from or “destroy reality with 
sovereign brusqueness.”32 But rather than follow Huizinga (and to a lesser extent Caillois) and 
distinguish between the generic features of play and certain contexts (work, professionalism, 
institutionalism), it is more useful to analyse the relationship between play as a disposition 
and genre, and the different socio-cultural uses to which it is continually being put. In this 
we are following Appadurai, who makes the point that it is impossible to state that things 
and practices definitively ‘belong to’ one particular economic category (gift or commodity), 
precisely because they continue to circulate, and are appropriated and reinterpreted, within 
different socio-cultural contexts. Commodities, for instance, have no definitive status, but 
can be understood as:
things in a certain situation, a situation that can characterise many different 
kinds of thing, at different points in their social lives. This means looking at the 
commodity potential of all things rather than searching fruitlessly for the magic 
distinction between commodities and other sorts of things … But how are we to 
define the commodity situation? I propose that the commodity situation in the 
social life of any ‘thing’ be defined as the situation in which its exchangeability 
(past, present, or future) for some other thing is its socially relevant feature.33 
We can do much the same with play and suggest that something is in a play situation or 
phase when its socially relevant features are commensurate with the imperatives and generic 
characteristics outlined by Huizinga and Caillois (it must be separated from ordinary life in 
some way; non-productive; volitional; adhere to its own rules or logic; and constitute a form 
of escape from everyday routines), rather than with those of antithetical regimes (such as 
capitalism, in which case exchangeability would be its socially relevant feature). But while we 
can accept that play has its own generic features, this is not the same as saying that it has 
(had) a stable meaning. If the manifestations of and the disposition to play move in and out of 
the commodity situation, for instance, then one person’s escape will become another person’s 
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profit, and vice versa. Moreover, in a cultural field such as sport where play has a significant 
discursive status (for example, play is clearly central to sport’s foundation narrative) but is 
at odds with dominant forms of capital (those of capitalism), its meanings and functions are 
likely to be relatively contingent and the subject of (non-playful) agonistics. So rather than 
understanding sport as having been animated, at some historical point, by a now atrophied 
ludic disposition, we can think of it as a set of sites which, despite the influence exerted 
upon it by governments, media and capitalism, continues (necessarily) to value, provoke, 
and provide occasions for, the disposition to play.
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